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Solicitor’s retaining lien – where money in first respondent’s trust account 
subject to dispute between applicant and second respondent - whether lien can 
exist over money in trust account in favour of first respondent – whether lien lost 
when money paid into court by consent 
 
The judgment of Daubney J in Magnamain Investments Pty Ltd v Baker Johnson 
Lawyers [2008] QSC 245 provides guidance on a number of aspects concerning the 
scope and maintenance of a solicitor’s retaining lien for costs. 
 
Facts 
 
In October 2001 the applicant (Magnamain Investments Pty Ltd) had paid an amount 
of $165,000 into the trust account of the first respondent (Baker Johnson). The money 
was paid for and on behalf of the second respondent (Jezer Construction Group Pty 
Ltd), apparently to enable the second respondent to satisfy the prudential requirements 
of the Building Services Authority.  
 
Baker Johnson paid the money, with accretions on that amount since its deposit, into 
court under an order made by consent by Muir J (as he then was) on 17 May 2002. 
The order required the money to be dealt with in accordance with the Court’s 
determination as to the entitlement, as between the applicant and the second 
respondent, to the fund. 
 
Baker Johnson, who had formerly acted as solicitor to the second respondent, applied 
for the payment out of court of the money it had paid into court under the order. It 
contended that it held a retaining (or “possessory”) lien over the sum in court for 
professional fees, and for outlays and counsel’s fees it had incurred in its 
representation of the second respondent. 
 
Issues 
 
There were three main issues requiring determination: 
(a) whether it was possible for a lien to subsist over the money in favour of Baker 
Johnson; 
(b) whether any lien was relinquished as a consequence of the order of 17 May 
2002; and 
(c) whether the first respondent was able to demonstrate, on proper evidence, an 
entitlement to be paid the money purportedly subject to the lien. 
 
Daubney J dealt with these issues in turn. 
 
Could there be a lien over trust money? 
 
Daubney J examined the nature of a solicitor’s retaining lien. As his Honour 
explained, a retaining lien is a right to retain possession of a client’s property until the 
client meets his or her obligations in respect of the solicitor’s costs. His Honour 
referred to a number of authorities about the characterisation of the lien and the 
practical underpinnings for it, including Barrat v Gough-Thomas [1951] Ch 242 at 
250 and Hughes v Hughes [1958] 3 All ER 179 at 180-181.  
 
He acknowledged that the lien is often described as applying to documents in the 
possession of a particular solicitor, but said the weight of authority appeared to 
indicate that the lien could also apply to money, including money held in a solicitor’s 
trust account.  
The judge noted that the Queensland Court of Appeal had considered this possibility 
in Phillipa Power & Associates v Primrose Couper Cronin Rudkin [1997] 2 Qd R 266 
although the judgments all acknowledged it was unnecessary to there express any 
final view on the question.  
In that case both Macrossan CJ and White J thought that a possessory lien could exist 
over money in a bank account.  
They referred to several authorities as accepting this conclusion. They did not think 
this view was impaired by the fact that a solicitor’s right to control operations on the 
trust account regulated by certain statutory provisions of the Trust Accounts Act 1973 
(See now Part 3.3 of the Legal Profession Act 2007) as this regulation did not deprive 
solicitors of their essential control or in its effect substitute any other controller.  
Derrington J had similarly found that the preponderance of authority supported the 
conclusion that a lien may exist in respect of the assets represented by the credit in the 
trust account notwithstanding that it does not consist of a physical entity capable of 
physical possession. 
In the light of the comments in this case, and the authorities referred to, Daubney J 
was prepared to find that money held in a trust account can be subject to a solicitor’s 
retaining lien.  
He said: 
Money in a trust account may not be in the physical possession of a solicitor, 
but, as observed by Macrossan CJ and White J, it remains under their control 
for so long as it is in the trust account. Accordingly, I see no reason why the 
principles applying to documents in the physical possession of a solicitor 
should not apply to monies in a solicitor’s trust account. 
Was the lien relinquished as a result of the order for payment into court? 
The judge then turned to consider whether any lien Baker Johnson may have held was 
relinquished as a result of the order of 17 May 2002. 
Daubney J first noted in this context that a retaining lien is possessory in nature. As a 
general rule it is determined if possession of the subject matter of the lien is 
voluntarily relinquished. Since the order of 17 May was made by consent his Honour 
said it appeared at first blush that the money had been voluntarily surrendered so that 
the lien would be extinguished. 
It was argued by counsel for Baker Johnson that this was not the case. Daubney J  
accepted there was authority to support the general proposition that “the delivery of 
an article for a limited and specific purpose and with the intention of maintaining the 
lien does not prevent possession from being continuous and therefore does not destroy 
any lien”: Re Ly; Ex parte Dixon v Ly (1995) 62 FLR 432.  
However, he distinguished this and other authorities referred to on the basis that, 
although a claim of entitlement to a lien over the money may have been privately 
maintained by Baker Johnson, there was no evidence on the material at hand to 
indicate that any such entitlement was asserted, either at the time the order was made, 
or when the money was actually paid into court.  
His Honour concluded: 
…the payment of monies into court pursuant to a consent order must, in the 
absence of any express reservation prior to the making of the order, at the time 
of the payment, or at any time in the subsequent six years, be held to constitute 
a clear relinquishment of any possessory lien that might otherwise have 
existed in respect of the monies.  
On the basis of this conclusion the judge held the application for payment out of court 
should be dismissed. 
Had entitlement to payment been demonstrated? 
Daubney J proceeded to consider whether the material before him would be sufficient 
to allow for the payment out of court of the specific amount claimed by Baker 
Johnson in its application, although it was strictly unnecessary to do this in view of 
his earlier finding.  
In that context he said it was clear that a solicitor may only claim a lien to the extent 
of his or her taxable costs, charges and expenses. These costs, and the solicitor’s 
entitlement to them, must be specified with some precision before a payment out of 
court pursuant to a purported lien could be made. Very limited material had been 
placed before the court and it was described as “manifestly insufficient” to support the 
claim.  
Orders 
The application for the payment out of court was dismissed with costs. 
